Abstract. This paper documents regional variation in economic development of the late Russian empire, reconstructing gross regional products and labor productivity by sector for all provinces of the country in the late 19 th century for the first time. My estimations of provincial GRPs in 1897 show that industrialization and structural change was an important but not the only engine of economic development. While wealthier provinces had larger industrial sector, substantial service sector or highly productive agriculture were alternative ways to prosperity. Agriculture was particular advanced in the South and the West Siberia where labor productivity was higher than in industry as well as in absolute terms. This finding contributes to the debate on 'agrarian crises' and backwardness of imperial economy. If the crises took place, it was limited to the black earth region.
Abstract. This paper documents regional variation in economic development of the late Russian empire, reconstructing gross regional products and labor productivity by sector for all provinces of the country in the late 19 th century for the first time. My estimations of provincial GRPs in 1897 show that industrialization and structural change was an important but not the only engine of economic development. While wealthier provinces had larger industrial sector, substantial service sector or highly productive agriculture were alternative ways to prosperity. Agriculture was particular advanced in the South and the West Siberia where labor productivity was higher than in industry as well as in absolute terms. This finding contributes to the debate on 'agrarian crises' and backwardness of imperial economy. If the crises took place, it was limited to the black earth region.
Introduction.
There is long lasting debate on economic development of the late Russian empire in historical literature driven by explorations of causes of Russian revolutions. Pessimists following Vladimir Lenin (1899) and Alexander Gershenkron (1966) argue that relative backwardness of Russian economy and especially agrarian sector transferred into political unrest. Optimists base their judgments on quantitative reconstruction of Russian national income between 1883-1913 by Paul Gregory (1983) pointing out that Russian economic development looks rather favorable in international comparisons. Recent studies (Allen 2003 , Grinin et al. 2010 , Mironov 2010 ) concentrate on the analysis of national trend, disputing mechanisms and prospects of Russian model of development.
Within country variation remains unknown and unexplored (Gregory 2001 ). This paper fills this gap and produces a more nuance picture of Russian economic development. It documents regional variation in economic development of the late Russian empire, for the first time reconstructing gross regional products and labor productivity by sector for all provinces of the country in the late XIX th century (excluding Grand duchy Finland but including Vyborg province which belongs to modern Russian Federation). I estimate 1897 ninety provincial GRPs from production side, calculating value added for 24 subsectors; I use 1897 census data on occupations to calculate labor productivity by sector. The closest study is a recent paper by Peter Lindert and Steven Nafziger (2013) who explore inequality in the Russian empire before the revolution and estimate income distribution in 1904 for fifty European provinces. However, their calculations do not cover Polish, Caucasian, Siberian and Central Asian provinces as well as do not present distribution of national income by sectors in contrast to this work.
A full snapshot of national income and labor productivity by provinces and sectors allows addressing old debate on economic development of the late Russian empire. Sectorial structure of provinces presents a clear picture on spread of modern industry. My estimations of provincial GRPs in 1897 show that industrialization and structural change was an important but not the only engine of economic development.
While wealthier provinces had larger industrial sector, substantial service sector or highly productive agriculture were alternative ways to prosperity. Agriculture was particular advanced in the South and the West Siberia where labor productivity was higher than in industry as well as in absolute terms. If 'agrarian crises' took place, it was limited to the black earth region.
Exploring within country variation in a relatively poor country, I also contribute to rapidly growing literature on industrialization of poor periphery versus rich core (Benetrix, O'Rourke and Williamson 2013) . I found highly unequal distribution of modern (large) industry over space in Russian empire and absence of a 'core' but presence of 'periphery' within the empire itself.
Finally, my study sheds lights on regional long-run economic growth in the North Eurasia, convergence/divergence in their development in the XX century. This has an important implication for our understanding of Soviet industrial policy and operation command economies in general.
The paper proceeds as following. The next section briefly describes my reconstruction procedure. In section 3 I present and discuss results of my estimations.
Section 4 pays special attention to agrarian crises debate in regional perspective. Section 5 explores GRPs correlates. Section 6 concludes.
Reconstructing 1897 provincial gross regional products.
I reconstruct gross regional product for ninety provinces of the Russian empire (50 European provinces; 10 Polish provinces; 11 Caucasian provinces; 9 Siberian provinces; 9 Central Asian provinces and Vyborg) in 1897 from production side by 24 subsectors 4 . I chose 1897 for the reconstruction because it was a year of the only imperial census that contains very detailed data on occupational structure of the population. Highly detailed data on industrial and agricultural output are available for this year as well. In this section I briefly present only main building blocks of the chosen methodology. Appendix describes the methodology in full details.
population census.
There was only one population census in the Russian empire conducted on January, 28 4 Agriculture - For railroads, water transport and communications I estimate value added in these sectors as a sum of wages and profits in these sectors and then spread them across regions using length of railroads and water ways in a province (Ministry of transport 1899) and population figures as weights. I use population census data to estimate value added in the sector of 'other' transport, banking and value added by servants.
I use population data to estimate total expenditures on housing. For urban housing I take Gregory (1983) estimate of urban renting and spread it across regions using urban population as weights. For rural renting I take population figures and average expenditures on housing from Commission on peasants' welfare (1901). I also account for cities' expenditures on water pipes and electricity, using Ministry of finance (1902).
Finally, for trade I first estimate provincial trade turnover from "Statisticheskie…" (1900), applying corrections as discussed in Strumilin (1924) , and then assume that value added was fixed at 15 percent level of turnover in all provinces. Agriculture produced a bulk of value added -more than fifty percent of provincial output -but labor productivity in this sector was the lowest, only two hundred 6 Table 1 of on-line appendix presents data for each and every province.
and thirteen rubles per worker. Service sector was the second large in terms of valued added (thirty percent of output in an average province) and the first one in terms of labor productivity (three hundred and seventy one rubles). Industry produced eighteen percent of provincial output; labor productivity in industry was three hundred and forty one rubles per worker, i.e. more than a half higher than in agriculture but a bit lower than in the service sector. Provinces vary substantially in terms of size of output, productivity and sectorial structure. In terms of output per capita, the most advanced regions were roughly the same.
Saint-Petersburg province was an absolute leader with an average GRP per capita of 414.24 rubles, almost twice more than the second one in the list. As figure 3 demonstrates, Baltic provinces in the North-West region were also relatively rich with income more than a hundred rubles per person. CIR provinces, South provinces, some
Polish provinces were almost equally wealthy -more than seventy five rubles per capita. The main factor that determines GRP per capita in a region was labor productivity. A conventional narrative points to structural change from agriculture to industry, known as industrialization, as a road to economic development, high labor productivity and wealth. The next subsection explores whether this was true for the late Russian empire.
Spread of industry.
Figure 5 reveals location of the most industrialized provinces in the empire. The share of value added in industry was relatively high (more than thirty percent) in four well-known industrial centers: CIR, Donbass (Ekaterinoslav province in the South) and Polish provinces. These regions fit the most productive economic provinces revealed by figure 2. In addition Amur, Baku, Chernomorsk and Fergana provinces that were rich in terms of GRP per capita had industrial sectors that produced more than thirty percent of provincial value added. However, not all provinces that produced high output or were rich in per capita terms had large shares of industry. In particular, Saint-Petersburg, Tomsk and many south provinces did not. Figure 4 demonstrates how agrarian the country was. In the majority of regions the share of industry did not exceed ten percent of gross provincial product. In other words, evidences on modern industry as the main engine of economic development are mixed. Industry was an engine in some regions but it was not the only road to prosperity. An alternative way could be small cottage industry and marketoriented craft production. If we consider share of value added only in this industrial subsector (figure 7), we can see that this was the choice of Central Asia. In general, however, this sector was small (less than seven percent for the majority of provinces) that undermines historical literature on the importance of craft production and protoindustrialization in Russia (Rudolph 1985; Naumova 1998) . Cottage production was about a quarter of total industrial output in average. 
Agrarian crises debate.
Agriculture was the largest sector of Russian economy (more than fifty percent on average) with the largest labor share employed (about seventy percent on average) and lowest labor productivity, accordingly. Because of that many contemporaries (including Lenin 1898) and scholars viewed agriculture as the most problematic sector suffering from permanent crises during the post-emancipation epoch. Gershenkron (1966) pointed to constraints that the institution of the commune implied as a main reason of low productivity, slow economic development and finally as an explanation of relative poverty and backwardness of the empire. This interpretation raised a lot of debate (Allen 2003; Gregory 1980 Gregory , 1983 Grinin 2010; Mironov 2010; Sanders 1984; Simms 1974; Wilbur 1983 ). Gregory (1983) challenged Gershenkron's view estimating that agricultural output and peasants' consumption grew in parallel with industrial production.
He speculates that the commune was a flexible institution that was able to ease at least some formal constraints implied by imperial laws and doubts that there was agrarian crises in the outskirts of the empire full of virgin land and dense population. Indeed, recent research (Chernina et al. 2013; Dower and Markevich 2013a,b; Nafziger 2008 Nafziger , 2010 demonstrates that the commune was a complicated institution. It limited peasant initiative and decisions but at the same time provided more choice than scholars previously believed. Gregory's second hypothesis on geography of the crises remained unexplored so far.
My reconstruction reveals that agriculture was developed highly unequally across space. In particular, labor productivity in agriculture varies substantially over regions ( figure 13 ). There were a number of regions with low labor productivity, less than two 
Correlates of Russian GRPs.
This section presents some simple correlates of Russian provincial GRPs. I regress provincial GRP per capita on available measures usually used in economic growth literature. Table 3 panels A and B present the results. Table 3 somewhere here.
Panel A explores correlates between labor productivity and sectorial structure.
Results suggest that higher labor productivity in all sectors transformed into higher income per capita (columns 1 and 2). The larger share of a sector was, the larger the effect of an increase in labor productivity in this sector in GRP per capita was. Column 3 of the table points to potential benefits of structural change. The larger shares of industry or service sector in provincial value added were, the larger income per person was.
Interestingly, however, the effect of one percent increase of service sector share onto GRP per capita was larger than similar increase in industry.
In panel B I regress GRP per capita on proxies for agglomeration (urban share), human capital (literacy), culture (shares of varicose religious minorities and religious diversity index) and income inequality (Gini index). I find some support for the presence of agglomeration effect. The coefficient on urban share is always positive and highly significant. 8 In contrast, human capital did not transfer into high level of development.
The coefficient on literacy is statistically insignificant and changes its sign (column 2 and 5). That could explain limited demand for education (Chaudhary et al. 2012 ).
GRP per capita was correlated with difference along cultural lines to some extent Finally, I do not find any effect of religious diversity or income inequality onto provincial GRP per capita (columns 3 and 5).
Conclusions.
This paper documents and discusses regional variation in economic development of the late Russian empire. I reconstruct 1897 gross regional products and labour productivity by sector for all provinces of the country from the production side for the first time. I find that labour productivity drove welfare. However, structural change from traditional agriculture to modern industry where labour productivity was higher was an important but not the only engine of economic development, as classical development narrative would predict. Large industrial sector was present in many wealthier provinces, but substantial service sector or highly productive agriculture were alternative ways to prosperity. Agriculture was particular advanced in the South and the West Siberia abundant in land and relatively dense in population. Labour productivity in agriculture was higher than in industry there as well as in absolute terms. This finding contributes to the debate on 'agrarian crises' and backwardness of imperial economy. There was clearly no crises at least in these regions. This finding has also an interesting implication for the 
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To be written.
